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Rédei and Gyenis suggest that Lewis’s Principal Principle is meaningful only if it satis-
ﬁes certain consistency conditions: starting from any assignment of credences to some
algebra of events, we must always be able to extend our algebra with events as “the value
of the objective chance of event E is p” and assign credences to such events in a consis-
tent manner. I show that this extension is possible. However, I also argue that this re-
quirement is unnecessary: the Principal Principle concerns subjective beliefs about ob-
jective chance; hence, events concerning those probabilities are meant to be in the
algebra initially.1. Introduction. Lewis proposed the Principal Principle in his seminal work
(1980). He argued that when a subjectivist believes in objective chance, the
credences he assigns to events and the credences he assigns to possible values
of the objective chances of these events cannot be arbitrary if the subjectivist
is reasonable: these credences (apart from making a probability measure)
have to satisfy a relation, namely, the relation that Lewis calls Principal Prin-
ciple. Accordingly, in Lewis’s work, credence is assigned to at least two kinds
of propositions: those expressing real events (e.g., the coin fell heads; we will
call them “chancy events”) and those expressing that the objective chances of
chancy events are equal to certain values (e.g., the chance of heads is, say,
35%). Recently, Rédei and Gyenis (2013) have proposed at various forums,*To contact the author, please write to: INRIA de Paris, 2 rue Simone Iff, 75012 Paris,
France; e-mail: bana@math.upenn.edu.
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this material at the Principal Principle Symposium of the 2014 PSA Biennial Meeting. I
am indebted to Carl Hoefer as well for his valuable comments at the symposium. I would
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Budapest-Krakow Research Group on Probability, Causality and Determinism.
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CONSISTENCY OF THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE 989such as the PSA Biennial Meeting in 2014, that the Principal Principle makes
sense only if whatever credence function is deﬁned on the chancy events,
such credence can be extended in a consistent manner to events concerning
values of the objective chances of the chancy events. They presented their
claim using the language of Bayesianism, but this is essentially what they
proposed.
In this work I show that the extendibility Rédei and Gyenis require essen-
tially always holds. Before doing so, however, I present an argument disput-
ing the claim of Rédei and Gyenis that this extendibility is indeed necessary
for the Principal Principle to be meaningful.
2. Credences of Events, Credences of Objective Chances. In this section
we turn to Lewis (1980) for guidance and inspiration. We examine one of the
examples he presented to motivate the Principal Principle, and we make some
general observations. The example and the observations will guide us through-
out the current work: On the one hand, they indicate how to construct the em-
bedding Rédei and Gyenis require for their consistency. On the other hand,
they help us understand the meaning of the Principal Principle, why it is a rea-
sonable requirement, and why it would be a reasonable requirement even if
Rédei and Gyenis’s consistency notion happened to fail to hold.
2.1. An Example by Lewis. Lewis’s (1980, 266) example is the following:All Suppose you are not sure that the coin is fair. You divide your belief
among three alternative hypotheses about the chance of heads, as follows.
• You believe to degree 27% that the chance of heads is 50%.
• You believe to degree 22% that the chance of heads is 35%.
• You believe to degree 51% that the chance of heads is 80%.Then to what degree should you believe that the coin falls heads? Answer.
(27% 50%)1 (22% 35%)1 (51% 80%); that is, 62%. Your degree
of belief that the coin falls heads, conditionally on any one of the hypoth-
eses about the chance of heads, should equal your unconditional degree of
belief if you were sure of that hypothesis. That in turn should equal the
chance of heads according to the hypothesis: 50% for the ﬁrst hypothesis,
35% for the second, and 80% for the third. Given your degrees of belief
that the coin falls heads, conditionally on the hypotheses, we need only ap-
ply the standard multiplicative and additive principles to obtain our answer.In this example, Lewis states that given an agent who believes in objective
chance, and given certain degrees of belief (credences; 27%, 22%, and 51%
in this case) that the agent assigns to the possible objective chances (50%,This content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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All u35%, and 80% in this case) of a certain chancy event (heads in this case), the
reasonable credence that the agent has to assign to the event itself is already
determined (62% in this case).
More precisely, in the example a coin is tossed, and there are two possi-
ble chancy outcomes: H (heads) and T (tails). The credence the subjectivist
ends up associating to H is C(H ) 5 0:62. However, this assignment of cre-
dence is not arbitrary: it is a derived credence. That is, the subjectivist be-
lieves in objective chance, and there is a primary credence associated to the
possible objective chances of H, and the credence of H is derived from this
primary credence:
• Subjectivist believes in objective chance of H.
• He thinks there are three possibilities for the objective chance of H:
ch(H ) 5 0:5           or           ch(H ) 5 0:35           or           ch(H) 5 0:8:
• He assigns the following credences to the possible objective chances:
C(ch(H) 5 0:5) 5 0:27;
C(ch(H) 5 0:35) 5 0:22;
C(ch(H) 5 0:8) 5 0:51:
• C(H) then is computed using the following formula:
C(A) 5 o
r
r  C(ch(A) 5 r): (1)
Note that in the situation above, it is implicitly assumed that assigning cre-
dences to values of the chances of certain events makes sense. In fact, we
should not be surprised. Lewis wrote about the subjectivist’s guide to objec-
tive chance; that is, objective chance is part of the world, and credence can be
assigned to possible values of it. The algebra of events is generated by at
least ﬁve events concerning the objective world: two events for the possible
chancy outcomes H and T and three more events for the possible values of
the objective chance of H (and hence of T ).
Lewis assumes (and Pettigrew [2012] showed that this should indeed be
assumed) that credence and chance are probability measures abiding the
laws of probability theory. Accordingly, assigning credences to statements
about the chances of events only makes sense if those statements signify
events of an underlying event algebra. That underlying event algebra also
contains the actual chancy events, because credences are assigned to them
aswell. Lewis’s example indicates that a credence function deﬁned on the pos-
sible values of the objective chances of chancy events and also on the possible
chancy events themselves is not an arbitrary probability measure: it has to sat-This content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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CONSISTENCY OF THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE 991isfy a consistency condition (i.e., eq. [1] in the example) on top of being a
probability measure.
2.2. General Observations. Where does equation (1) come from? If A
is some event of the real world, cht is the chance function over such events at
some time t, andC is the credence function, the general idea that is expressed
by the above example can be written as C(A) 5 or r C(cht(A) 5 r), where
the sum runs through all r values cht(A) can possibly take. Clearly, in case of
a continuum, the summation has to be replaced by an integral. If we throw in
Lewis’s admissible evidence too (think of it as facts from the past), then the
above equation takes the following form:
C(AjE) 5 o
r
r  C(cht(A) 5 r E):j (2)
Note that if C satisﬁes the laws of probability, then the following statement
always holds:
C(AjE) 5 o
r
C(Ajcht(A) 5 r ∧ E)  C(cht(A) 5 rjE), (3)
as long as orC(cht(A) 5 rjE) 5 1, that is, as long as r runs through all pos-
sible values of cht(A). The Principal Principle requires that
C(Ajcht(A) 5 r ∧ E) 5 r (4)
hold for all admissibleE events. Lewis (1980) noted that equation (3) together
with the Principal Principle (4) immediately implies equation (2).
Themeaning of the Principal Principle is of course that a reasonable agent
should choose the credence such that if the objective chance of a chancy
event A is r according to the evidence collected by the agent, then the cre-
dence of A should be the same r unless some further inadmissible evidence
E overwrites this. For example, if the agent has evidence that a coin is biased
such that the chance of H is 0.8, then he should choose the credence of H to
be 0.8, unless he has some further evidence that overwrites this choice, for
example, when the toss already happened and he knows the result. Without
further such evidence, for example, just before the coin is tossed, the reason-
able credence to be assigned to H is 0.8.
Suppose now the agent learned that cht(A) 5 r and updated his credence
function accordingly to C0:
C0(BjE) ≔ C(Bjcht(A) 5 r ∧ E)This content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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All ufor all B. That is, the agent added cht(A) 5 r to the set of evidences. Is it
true that this new credence function automatically satisﬁes the Principal Prin-
ciple for any cht(B) 5 r
0 condition, or are additional assumptions needed?
Just from assuming that C satisﬁes the Principal Principle without admis-
sible E events, it does not follow that C0 also satisﬁes the Principal Principle.
However, it does follow from the Principal Principle with admissible E
events included, as long as events of the form cht(A) 5 r are admissible.
And indeed, Lewis insists that such events must be admissible. Then, apply-
ing the Principal Principle to cht(A) 5 r ∧ E instead of E, we have
C0(B cht(B) 5 r
0 ∧ E) 5 C(Bj jcht(B) 5 r0 ∧ (cht(A) 5 r ∧ E)) 5 r0:
Now consider this: remember, equation (2) says, for any admissible ev-
idence E, C(AjE) 5 or r C(cht(A) 5 rjE ), where the sum runs through all
r values that cht(A) can possibly take. We have seen that this follows from
the Principal Principle if the credence function obeys the laws of probabil-
ity. The other direction is also true: the assumption that the credence C sat-
isﬁes the laws of probability and that events of the form cht(A) 5 r are
admissible, together with (2), implies the Principal Principle. To see this,
consider that
C(Ajcht(A) 5 r ∧ E) 5 o
r0
r0  C(cht(A) 5 r0 cht(A) 5 r ∧ E),j (5)
where we applied equation (2) not for E but for cht(A) 5 r ∧ E. But
o
r0
r0  C(cht(A) 5 r0jcht(A) 5 r ∧ E) 5 r
for any r, because if C satisﬁes the laws of probability, then C(cht(A) 5
r0jcht(A) 5 r ∧ E) 5 1 if r0 5 r and C(cht(A) 5 r0jcht(A) 5 r ∧ E) 5 0 if
r0 ≠ r no matter what E is. With this, equation (5) becomes
C(Ajcht(A) 5 r ∧ E) 5 r: (6)
Hence, given that the laws of probability are satisﬁed and that events of
the form cht(A) 5 r are admissible, the Principal Principle and the validity of
equation (2) for all admissible E are in fact equivalent. This is an important
observation, because as (2) implies the Principal Principle, it gives us a hint
how to construct in the sections below the extension Rédei and Gyenis re-
quire for their consistency notion: namely, if the credence of each chancy
event A is computed from the credences assigned to the possible values of
the objective chance of A using equation (2), then the credence function on
the chances and on the chancy events satisﬁes the Principal Principle.This content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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CONSISTENCY OF THE PRINCIPAL PRINCIPLE 9933. Consistency Questions of Rédei and Gyenis. Rédei andGyenis (2013)
raised the question what it really meant to conditionalize with the event that
the chance of something is a certain value. They posed their question in a
more abstract and mathematically well-deﬁned way than how we have pro-
ceeded so far. It is essentially as follows.
“Chance” in their terminology is replaced by a probability measure pobj
over an algebra Sobj representing the chancy events (corresponding to H
and T in the example). They drop time t to make the discussion simpler,
as it is not necessary for presenting their complaints. Credence is replaced
by a probability measure psubj over some algebra Ssubj. They observe that
it is necessary that Ssubj includes Sobj, as we want to associate credence
at least to the real events. Furthermore, Ssubj has to contain events of the form
KPobj(A) 5 rL, meaning the event that “the objective chance of A equals r.” I
intentionally do not follow their notation Kpobj(A) 5 rL because I want to be
able to write KPobj(A) 5 pobj(A)L meaning “the objective chance of A equals
pobj(A),”where pobj(A) is a probability measure on Sobj. Rédei and Gyenis de-
ﬁne the abstract Principal Principle:1. No
becau
situat
All Deﬁnition 1. The subjective probabilities psubj(A) are related to the objec-
tive probabilities pobj(A), as
psubj(AjKPobj(A) 5 pobj(A)L) 5 pobj(A), (7)
as long as the conditioning makes sense.1
Remark 1. Unfortunately, Rédei and Gyenis wrote their Principal Princi-
ple in the form psubj(AjKpobj(A) 5 rL) 5 pobj(A), which is confusing as it
is not correct (it is not the Principal Principle, and in fact it should not be
required) when r is not the objective probability pobj(A). It is clear, however,
from their discussions of their formula that they only consider the case
when pobj(A) 5 r. Hence, I wrote it in the form of equation (7) to avoid
this confusion. In our treatment, pobj is just a measure over Sobj; it may ac-
tually be different from the real objective chance, although Rédei and
Gyenis are not concerned with this situation. (In fact, the Principal Princi-
ple as Lewis stated it has nothing to say about the real objective chance; it
only considers evidence about the objective chance.)Rédei and Gyenis have another notion too, the stable abstract Principal Prin-
ciple, which also requires that given any A ∈ Sobj, for all B ∈ Sobj,te that Rédei and Gyenis (2013) left out admissible evidence for simplicity. That is
se their consistency problem is nontrivial even in that case. We stick to this simpler
ion in this work.
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All upsubj(A KPobj(A) 5 pobj(A)L)
 5 psubj(AjKPobj(A) 5 pobj(A)L \ KPobj(B)
5 pobj(B)L),
as long as the conditional probabilities make sense. In other words, learn-
ing the objective probability of B should not destroy the Principal Principle
for A.
Rédei and Gyenis also deﬁne their strong consistency condition:se subDeﬁnition 2. The abstract Principal Principle is deﬁned to be strongly con-
sistent if the following hold: Given any probability space (Xobj, Sobj, pobj)
and another probability measure p0subj on Sobj, there exists a probability
space (Xsubj, Ssubj, psubj) and a Boolean algebra embedding h of Sobj into
Ssubj such that for every A ∈ Sobj, psubj(h(A)) 5 p0subj(A), and there exists
an A0 ∈ Ssubj with the property psubj(h(A)jA0) 5 pobj(A), and if A, B ∈ Sobj
and A ≠ B then A0 ≠ B0.Clearly, A0 would be the event “the objective probability of A is pobj(A).”
Rédei and Gyenis, then, have two claims:
• In order for the (abstract) Principal Principle to be meaningful, it is
necessary that strong consistency hold, and strong consistency is tac-
itly assumed.
• It is not clear whether strong consistency holds.
I strongly disagree with the ﬁrst claim. Lewis’s (1980) work is titled “ASub-
jectivist’s Guide to Objective Chance.” That is, chance is viewed as being
objective, and credence can be associated to statements about objective
chance.When the objective world contains both the events and their chances,
credence is not an arbitrary probability measure, but the Principal Principle
limits what a reasonable credence function may look like. Coming back to
Lewis’s example we cited at the beginning, given the credences assigned
to the various biases, it does not make sense to assign 50% credence to heads,
but it has to be 62%. In other words, the Principal Principle is a consistency
condition itself for the case when we assign credences to statements about
objective chance. That is, there is only one Sobj; for a subjectivist who be-
lieves in objective chance, statements about objective chance are in Sobj to
start with, and the Principal Principle is the consistency condition that we
have to require for a credence function on Sobj.
This view that I proposed in the previous paragraph I believe is also sup-
ported by the usual Bayesian analysis. The Bayesian prior, which corre-
sponds to credence, is given not on the real outcomes such as heads and tails
but instead on the set of probability measures (described by some parameter)
over the real outcomes. In this set of probability measures, of course, eventsThis content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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the set of the form fp : p(A) 5 rg. That is, in Bayesian analysis as well,
statements about the values of these probabilities are part of the event space
from the beginning. Prior probabilities of the chancy events are computed
from the prior measure over the probabilities similar to formula (1), just
as Lewis did his computation.
However, if we insist that Sobj denotes only the chancy events and that it
should be extended, then from the above, it is clear how to do it: we take all
probability measures on Sobj and deﬁne an event algebra on it that is ﬁne
enough to include all sets of the form fp : p(A) 5 rg, whereA ∈ Sobj and r ∈
½0, 1. Let us call this event algebra over the probabilities Schobj (this is the al-
gebra of chances). We can deﬁne Ssubj ≔ Sobj Schobj (i.e., the algebra gener-
ated by elements of the form A1  A2, where A1 ∈ Sobj and A2 ∈ Schobj). But
even in such a setup, an agent would not start from a credence function
on Sobj that he would want to extend to Ssubj. Instead, he would start ﬁxing
a credence function on the chances—or, with Bayesian language, he would
ﬁrst ﬁx a Bayesian prior pchsubj on Schobj—and would obtain the prior probability
p0subj on Sobj using the usual formula corresponding to (1):
p0subj(A) ≔ o
r
r  pchsubj(fp : p(A) 5 rg),
which is just the same as the expected value of the function p↦ p(A) with
respect to the probability pchsubj.
2 Furthermore, the joint probabilities on Ssubj
would also be the usual:3
psubj(A1  A2) ≔ o
r
r  pchsubj(f p : p(A1) 5 r ∧ p ∈ A2g):
That is exactly what happens in Lewis’s example about the coin tosses: in
that case Sobj can be taken to have two atomic elements, heads and tails,
andSchobj to have three atomic elements with nonzero credence (Bayesian prior):
• one putting 50% chance on heads with credence 27%.
• one putting 35% chance on heads with credence 22%.
• one putting 80% chance on heads with credence 51%.
Then the credence can be extended to Sobj giving 62% for heads and 38%
for tails. It is not the 62% and the 38% that an agent postulates ﬁrst and then
ﬁnds a measure on Schobj (which would correspond to the suggestion of Rédei
and Gyenis), but the other way.2. With integral notation, it is p0subj(A) ≔
Ð
X chobj
p(A)dpchsubj( p).
3. With integral notation, it is psubj(A1  A2) ≔
Ð
A2
p(A1)dp
ch
subj( p).
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tAbout the second point Rédei and Gyenis made, I do agree. It is not ob-
vious, but still it turns out to be essentially true, which is the topic of the res
of this discussion.
4. Strong Consistency of the (Abstract) Principal Principle. Even if
strong consistency does not seem to us necessary to be required in general
in certain cases it may be interesting to ﬁx credences on the set of objective
events and then try to extend it to a larger algebra that includes also events
like KPobj(A) 5 rL. Such an extension was, for example, considered by
Diaconis and Zabell (1982, sec. 2.1) without the strong consistency condi-
tion.
Here we prove the following strong consistency theorem:Theorem. Given any probability space (Xobj, Sobj, pobj) and another proba-
bility measure p0subj on Sobj, if there is an a ∈ (0, 1) such that for all A ∈ Sobj
a  pobj(A) < p0subj(A) or pobj(A) 5 p0subj(A) 5 0 (i.e., we can “pull” pobj under
p0subj), then strong consistency holds: there exists a probability space
(Xsubj, Ssubj, psubj) and a Boolean algebra embedding h of Sobj into Ssubj such
thati) For every A ∈ Sobj, there exists an A0 ∈ Ssubj with the property
psubj(h(A)jA0) 5 pobj(A): (8)
ii) If A, B ∈ Sobj and A ≠ B, then A0 ≠ B0.
iii) The probability space (Xsubj, Ssubj, psubj) is an extension of the prob-
ability space (Xobj, Sobj, p0subj) with respect to h; that is, we have
psubj(h(A)) 5 p
0
subj(A)  A ∈ Sobj: (9)
iv) psubj is stable: for all A, A1, : : : , An ∈ Sobj, we have
pobj(A) 5 psubj(h(A)jA0 \ A01 \ : : : \ A0n): (10)Proof. Consider the set of all probability measures on (Xobj, Sobj): denote i
by X chobj (this is the set of all possible chances):
X chobj ≔ f p : p is a probability measure on (Xobj,Sobj)g:
For an A ∈ Sobj and an r ∈ ½0, 1, let us deﬁne
KPobj(A) 5 r L
ch ≔ f p : p(A) 5 rg ⊆ X chobj:
Take a ﬁne enough j-algebra Schobj on X chobj such that for all A ∈ Sobj and r ∈
½0, 1, KPobj(A) 5 rLch ∈ Schobj.u/t-and-c).
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All I claim that it is possible to ﬁnd a measure pchsubj (credence of chances) on
S chobj such that pchsubj(\ni51 KPobj(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)Lch) ≠ 0 for any A1, : : : , An ∈ Sobj
(in order to be able to take conditionals), and for all A ∈ Sobj,
p0subj(A) 5 o
r
r  pchsubj(K Pobj(A) 5 r Lch),
where the summation is taken over all values r for which pchsubj(KPobj(A) 5
rLch) ≠ 0 (it could also be deﬁned as an integral over ½0,1; see n. 2). For
a p ∈ X chobj, let dp denote a Dirac measure concentrated on p. That is, for any
S ∈ Schobj, dp(S) 5 1 if and only if p ∈ S, and dp(S) 5 0 if and only if p ∉ S.
We prove that pchsubj can simply be taken to be of the form
pchsubj 5 a  dpobj 1 b  dp0 ,
where a and b are conveniently chosen constants and p0 is a probability
measure on (Xobj, Sobj): we assumed that there is an a ∈ (0, 1) such that
for all A ∈ Sobj, a  pobj(A) < p0subj(A) or pobj(A) 5 p0subj(A) 5 0. Clearly,
the measure a  dpobj is a positive measure on (X chobj, Schobj), but as a ∈ (0, 1),
it is smaller than a probability measure. Let b ≔ 1 2 a, and let p0 ≔
(1=1 2 a)  ( p0subj 2 a  pobj). As a ∈ (0, 1) and a  pobj < p0subj, p0 is a posi-
tive measure on (Xobj, Sobj). As p0(Xobj) 5 (1=1 2 a)  (1 2 a) 5 1, this
is a probability measure on (Xobj, Sobj) and hence an element of X chobj. Let
pchsubj ≔ a  dpobj 1 b  dp0 :
Since a 1 b 5 1, this is also a probability measure. For any A1, ::: , An ∈
Sobj,
pchsubj(\
n
i51
KPobj(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)L
ch) 5 pchsubj(\
n
i51
fp : p(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)g)
5 a  dpobj (\
n
i51
fp : p(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)g)
1 b  dp0 (\
n
i51
fp : p(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)g)
5 a 1 b  dp0 (\
n
i51
fp : p(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)g)
≥ a > 0,
where we used the fact that pobj ∈ \ni51fp : p(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)g and that
dpobj (S ) 5 1 if and only if pobj ∈ S. We also have that for all A ∈ Sobj,This content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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r
r  pchsubj(KPobj(A) 5 rLch)
5 o
r
r  (a  dpobj (fp : p(A) 5 rg) 1 b  dp0 (fp : p(A) 5 rg))
5 pobj(A)  a 1 p0(A)  b
5 pobj(A)  a 1 112a  (p0subj(A) 2 a  pobj(A))  (1 2 a)
5 pobj(A)  a 1 p0subj(A) 2 a  pobj(A) 5 p0subj(A):
Here, note that pchsubj(KPobj(A) 5 rL
ch) ≠ 0 for at most two different r’s—
r 5 pobj(A) and r 5 p0(A)—so there is no problem using the summation
sign.
Let (Xsubj, Ssubj) ≔ (Xobj  X chobj, Sobj Schobj). Here, Sobj Schobj is the j-
algebra generated by elements of the form A  E, where A ∈ Sobj and E ∈
Schobj. Let the measure psubj on (Xsubj, Ssubj) be generated by
psubj(A  E) ≔ o
r
r  pchsubj(fp : p(A) 5 r ∧ p ∈ Eg)
for all A ∈ Sobj and E ∈ Schobj. Again, because of the way we deﬁned pchsubj,
for any A  E, there are at most two values of r (pobj(A) and p0(A)) such
that the summands in the above summation are nonzero, so it is not incor-
rect to keep using the summation instead of an integral.
For all A ∈ Sobj, let
h(A) ≔ A  X chobj
and
KPobj(A) 5 rL ≔ Xobj  fp : p(A) 5 rg 5 Xobj  KPobj(A) 5 rLch;
and A0 ≔ KPobj(A) 5 pobj(A)L.
Clearly,
psubj(h(A)) 5 psubj(A  X chobj)
5 o
r
r  pchsubj(fp : p(A) 5 r ∧ p ∈ X chobjg)
5 o
r
r  pchsubj(fp : p(A) 5 rg)
5 o
r
r  pchsubj(KPobj(A) 5 rLch)
5 p0subj(A)
by the choice of pchsubj.
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All Then, for A1, : : : , An ∈ Sobj, we have
psubj

\n
i51
A0i

5 psubj

\n
i51
KPobj(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)L

5 psubj

\n
i51
(Xobj  KPobj(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)Lch )

5 pchsubj

\n
i51
KPobj(Ai) 5 pobj(Ai)L
ch

> 0,
as we have seen.
To see iv, ﬁx A, A1, : : : , An ∈ Sobj, and for simplicity let A0 ≔ A. By ap-
plying the above deﬁnitions, and as psubj(\ni50 A0i) > 0,
psubj

h(A)
 A0 \ \ni51A0i

5
psubj

h(A)\\n
i50
A0i

psubj
 \n
i50
A0i

5
psubj

(AX chobj)\\
n
i50
(XobjKPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)Lch)

psubj
 \n
i50
(XobjKPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)Lch)

5
psubj

(AX chobj)\

Xobj\
n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
ch

psubj

Xobj\
n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
ch

5
psubj

A\n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
ch

psubj

Xobj\
n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
ch

5
∑
r
r  pchsubj

fp : p(A)5r ∧ p∈\n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
chg

∑
r
r  pchsubj

p : p(Xobj)5r ∧ p∈\
n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
ch)

5 o
r
r 
pchsubj

fp : p(A)5r ∧ p∈\n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
chg

pchsubj

p : p(Xobj)51 ∧  p∈\
n
i50
KPobj(Ai)5pobj(Ai)L
ch)
This content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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5 o
r
r 
pchsubj

p : p ðAÞ5r ∧ p ðAÞ5pobj ðAÞ ∧ ∧
n
i51
pðAiÞ5pobjðAiÞ

pchsubj

p : p ðAÞ5pobj ðAÞ ∧ ∧
n
i51
pðAiÞ5pobjðAiÞ

5 pobj ðAÞ
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All use subbecause the numerator is only nonzero when r 5 pobj(A), in which case the
numerator and the denominator are equal. This gives us iv. For the special
case when there is only one A1, namely, Xobj, we obtain the proof of i.
Finally, consider ii. In the construction so far, for A ≠ B, A0 ≠ B0 is ac-
tually not ensured. But it is easy to modify Xsubj so that this condition is
ensured as well. Consider the disjoint union Xsubj ] Sobj, set psubj(Sobj) ≔
0, and deﬁne A0 ≔ KPobj(A) 5 pobj(A)L [ fAg. This will not interfere with
the probabilities, but including fAg ensures that A ≠ B implies A0 ≠ B0.
QED
Remark 2. I left the proof of the satisﬁability of ii to the end, because I
think that this condition, although easily satisﬁable, should not be re-
quired. Set A0 corresponds to the event “the probability of A is pobj(A),”
while B0 corresponds to the event “the probability of B is pobj(B).” There
is no reason for these propositions to necessarily denote different events
in the probability space. For example, when a coin is tossed, “the proba-
bility of heads is 1/3” and “the probability of tails is 2/3” can reasonably
correspond to the same set in a Kolmogorovianmodel, while heads and tails
are different events.
Remark 3. Note, in the special case when pobj 5 p
0
subj, then p
ch
subj 5 dpobj , no
matter what a we chose.If Xobj (and hence Sobj) is ﬁnite, and if pobj is absolutely continuous with re-
spect to p0subj (i.e., for any A ∈ Sobj, pobj(A) ≠ 0 implies p0subj(A) ≠ 0), then for
any
a ∈

0, minA∈ Sobj ∧ pobj(A) > 0
p0subj(A)
pobj(A)

⊆ (0,1)
we have that for all A ∈ Sobj, a  pobj(A) < p0subj(A) or pobj(A) 5 p0subj(A) 5 0,
and the conclusions of the theorem hold. Hence, we haveCorollary. If Xobj is ﬁnite, and if pobj is absolutely continuous with respect
to p0subj, then strong consistency holds.
Remark 4. Rédei and Gyenis also deﬁne a consistency property for “de-
bugged” versions of the Principal Principle. I do not consider that caseThis content downloaded from 158.064.079.007 on September 19, 2018 03:47:39 AM
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All here for two reasons. One is that the handling of admissible evidence
would raise a whole array of new issues. The other is that as argued in this
article, strong consistency is not needed for the Principal Principle to make
sense, and that is true even if we throw in admissible evidence, no matter
whether we consider the original version or debugged versions.
Remark 5. I wrote that strong consistency “essentially” holds. I put it this
way because of the above absolute continuity condition. Note, the absolute
continuity of pobj with respect to p
0
subj is a necessary condition, because a
zero p0subj cannot be updated by new knowledge to nonzero probability.
In the ﬁnite case, absolute continuity is sufﬁcient to pull pobj below p
0
subj;
in the inﬁnite case it is not sufﬁcient. I in fact believe that the absolute con-
tinuity condition is sufﬁcient to prove strong consistency even in the inﬁ-
nite case (without pulling the whole of pobj below p
0
subj) but with a more
complex construction for psubj. Proving that remains for future work.REFERENCES
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